决策的本质

PrefaceIntroduction1　Model I: The Rational Actor　A Rigorous Model of Action　A Rational Actor Paradigm　The Classical Model Illustrated　　Classical Realism. Neorealism (Structural Realism).　　International Institutionalism. Liberalism. Strategy, War,　　and Rational Choice.　Variants and Uses of the Classical Model2 The Cuban Missile Crisis: A First Cut Why Did the Soviet Union Decide to Place Offensive Missiles in Cuba?　　 Hypothesis 1: Cuban Defense. Hypothesis 2: Cold War Politics.　　 Hypothesis 3: Missile Power. Hypothesis 4: Berlin--Win,

PrefaceIntroduction1　Model I: The Rational Actor　A Rigorous Model of Action　A Rational Actor Paradigm　The Classical Model Illustrated　　Classical Realism. Neorealism (Structural Realism).　　International Institutionalism. Liberalism. Strategy, War,　　and Rational Choice.　Variants and Uses of the Classical Model2 The Cuban Missile Crisis: A First Cut Why Did the Soviet Union Decide to Place Offensive Missiles in Cuba?　　 Hypothesis 1: Cuban Defense. Hypothesis 2: Cold War Politics.　　 Hypothesis 3: Missile Power. Hypothesis 4: Berlin--Win,　　 Trade, or Trap. Why Did the United States Respond to the Missile Deployment with a Blockade?　　 Alternative I: Do Nothing. Alternative 2: Diplomatic　　 Pressures. Alternative 3: A Secret Approach to Castro.　　 Alternative 4: Invasion. Alternative 5: Air Strike.　　 Alternative 6: Blockade. Why Did the Soviet Union Withdraw the Missiles?3　Model II: Organizational Behavior　Organizational Logic and Efficiency　Organizational Logic and Organizational Culture　Interactive Complexity　NASA: Hero and Goat　Organizational Behavior Paradigm4 The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Second Cut　Deployment of Soviet Missiles in Cuba　　The Soviet Build-up in Detail. Organizational　　Implementation.　Imposition of a U.S. Blockade of Cuba　　Organizational Intelligence. Organizational Options.　　Organizational Implementation.　The Withdrawal of Soviet Missiles from Cuba5 Model III: Governmental Politics　The Governmental Politics Model Illustrated __　　1. Separated Institutions Sharing Power. 2. The Power to Persuade. 3. Bargaining According to the Processes. 4. Power Equals Impact on Outcome. 5. Intranational and International Relations.　Group Processes and Their Effects on Choices and Action　　1. Better Decisions. 2. The "Agency" Problem: Principals, Agents, and Players. 3. Participants: Who Plays? 4. Decision　　Rules. 5. Framing Issues and Setting Agendas. 6. Groupthink.　　7. Complexity of ]oint Action.　A Governmental Politics Paradigm6 The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Third Cut The Imposition of a Blockade by the United States　　 The Politics of Discovery. The Politics of Choice. Soviet Withdrawal of the Missiles from Cuba　　 Soviets Kill an American U-2 Pilot. The President and the　　 Chairman. The "Deal": Resolving the Turkish Problem.　　 The "Deal": Resolving the Cuban Problem.7 Conclusion Summing Up: Differences in Interpretation Summing Up: Different Answers or Different Questions? Where Do We Go from Here?Index

这是第二次世界大战后最有影响力的政治学著作之一。《决策的本质》原作以独特的视角审视了冷战时期的关键事件。此经典著作的第二版不仅仅是修订，更是重写：重新解释了古巴导弹危机前后的理论及事件；也融入了肯尼迪录音带及最近解密的苏联文件的信息。第二版提炼了原著中格雷厄姆·阿利森任美国助理国防部长及哈佛大学肯尼迪政府学院院长时期的一些评论和观点。同时也有一位新的作者菲利普·泽利科参与了第二版的撰写，他著有十分畅销的评论著作《肯尼迪录音带》(The Kennedy Tapes，Harvard University Press，1 997)。 《决策的本质》(第二版)鲜活地展现了重压之下的决策过程，此书也是唯一一部尝试解决这一经久不衰的问题的著作：人们如何理解政府的举动?

不愧为全面、有深度、新颖的著作。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　——迪亚娜·沃恩（Diane Vaughan），波士顿大学　优于经典、高于原创的著作。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　——理查德·贝茨（Richard K.Betts），哥伦比亚大学　　修订版加强了在理论和历史方面的内容，显求了卓越成效！　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　——斯　科特·萨根（Scott Sagan），斯坦福大学